The Future Armed Forces

Sunday scaries, and overstepping (?)

So. I have been asked to moderate a panel next week on the future of the armed forces. And it threw me in an overthinking spiral about my work so far, and where I am moving ahead.

If you’ve read at least one of my posts, you must know that this stakie is very much my defence journal, where I analyze documents or just throw questionably written tantrums. This one’s no exception. I have thoughts – about the discourse around military modernization, 2% of GDP on defence spending, the current wars (eh, less so), personnel challenges, and military ethics.

This might be the most militaristic you’ll see me be. Maybe make sure you’re sitting down.

Alright, where am I going with this?

I think we can all agree that the war in Ukraine has sent shockwaves through the Western world. In fact, such a statement has become a trite aphorism. But while Europe is witnessing raging war unseen since 1944, conflicts continue to pop up and tensions climb up the proverbial ladder across the world – the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific, the Arctic… Security considerations have infiltrated all aspects of society as we deal with the weaponization of supply chains, dis-/misinformation, and cyber attacks.

The work ahead to address these challenges is Herculean, and the resources needed monumental. Hence the (urgent) conversation across the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to reach 2% of GDP in defence spending (and with 20% of that budget to be dedicated to research and development and capability expenditures).

At heart, the West ought to modernize its militaries (and the systems that allow them to function).

So far, so good (right?)

But while we are (in the case of Canada, specifically¹) looking into spending that much money and going through a massive fleet transition for all three services, one central question remains:

Are we truly setting up our future armed forces for success?

Hold on, what now?

Bear with me here, I am trying to get to a point – and here it is. While we need to do the work necessary to support Ukraine towards victory (which in my opinion is not necessarily matter in the control of armed forces themselves, but more of that of departments/ ministries of defence), we also have quite a substantial amount of threats that we need to be able to deter and counter. Our North, Strong and Free outlines those threats well, and maybe sprinkle the Indo-Pacific Strategy around it; you’ll get the full picture.

But is the goal to stay there? Do we want to just focus on the threats of today and await a cycle of mind-boggling levels of transformation once the equipment we acquire today has past its life cycle? Do we want force structure, force generation, readiness frameworks, training, and professional military education to go through similar cycles?

Obviously not, and this is why most defence commentators in Canada advocate for agile, nimble, and iterative defence procurement.

What about we aimed for that agility, nimbleness, and iteration for all over aspects of military functions?

Well, duh…

While self-evident, it seems to me that we have let those principles get stuck in the procurement domain, and the noise around them have become louder as we are catching up with the adoption of new and advanced technology and the transformation they require.

As I have written for CGAI last year,² a lot of our problems within the military are connected – from conduct related culture change to procurement and digital transformation. In short, culture is the challenge. And by culture I mean the structures that organize the military as an institution, the values that represent them, the policies that reinforce them, as well as the behaviours that align or contradict them and how these are rewarded or punished. In short, the whole shebang.

Therefore, as we are looking to move towards agile and nimble military organizations, we need to ask ourselves: are we ensuring all the moving parts are truly in place?

So many questions…

This is where I am right now, asking questions (not in the conspiratorial way, I promise). Before I outline them out, I want to underline that I am not saying that nobody is thinking about these issues – reading through a bunch of material, it’s clear that military leaders are thinking about this.

But are we having real conversations about this at the civilian level? Have we transcended the civilian military divide in those conversations? Do civilian decision makers have these conversations when thinking of policies?

Get to them!

Alright! So to start, I think it goes without saying that we need to make sure our efforts do not go towards one type of conflict or one type of threat. As Paul Robinson wrote:

Military planners like to prepare for all eventualities. For them, the possibility that future wars might resemble that in Ukraine may be reason enough why one should prepare for it. There are dangers in this approach (p. 88).

With Ukraine being the conflict the closest to the transatlantic alliance, there is a concern that we will find ourselves in a same type of war soon enough. But as ONSAF underlines, Europe is not the only potential theatre Canada and its allies can find itself engaged in. And we need to prepare for that.

As we discuss more and more the importance of whole-of-government, whole-of-society, or even whole-of-nations approaches to resilience and deterrence, are we ensuring that we do have a whole-of-military approach in place? Are all elements within the military working seamlessly together to reach operational effectiveness and mission success? While it might sound ridiculous on its face, Canada is not very well known for jointness. In fact, it seems that pan domain (or its American cousin joint all domain) serves as a way to reignite that much needed conversation and transformation, with a digital/ technological flavour. But we will have to make sure it is not just the tech that works seamlessly.

Further on the technological transformation aspect of it all; are we embracing technology in the way that meets our short- and long-term needs and goals? Are we taking into account the enterprise side of integration as much as the operational side?

Keeping in the same line of thinking, but maybe at a more macro level, are our military structures fit for purpose? Are the force structures and force generation processes adequately and appropriately serving the institution? As we are grappling with concerning personnel shortages that the government expects to overcome only by 2032, are our approaches to recruitment and personnel selection proper? Are we clinging to old paradigm that may have worked during the Cold War era that are no longer helping us? More controversially, perhaps, are our militaries in their present form institutions that new generations want to serve in? And if not, why is the case and how can we rectify that?

Little CDL Caveat: I think this is all the more critical to sit with that question as the West is flirting with the idea of reinstating conscription. If we are ready to move away from the all volunteer force to go back to a draft model, then it means that militaries are ready to change their standards and adapt to new personnel realities. 


Why cannot we meet in the middle and revise standards and processes in an all volunteer force framework? Why is it jeopardizing the forces while going with a conscription model is not?

To wrap it all up with a bow, are the values and ethics paradigms militaries currently subscribed the right ones? Not just in a sense of whether these are the right values to attract talent, but also ones that help create an effective deterrent. And are the structures in place actually empower the actualization of those values and ethics – or do they stand in contrast to them? What is the state of combat motivation within Western militaries?

That’s it.

Quite literally. I do not pretend that I am offering anything new; I am honestly processing a whole range of information I have been absorbing over the past years, months, weeks, and days.

But one think I would like to underline is that answering these questions will cost money, and a lot at that. I do not mean it in the sense of “let’s pay academics to write position papers that will be taught at staff college.” I mean in their actualizations. Militaries, and especially the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), need a substantial amount of reforms – not just around issues of sexual misconduct (this is important, but it is one piece of the puzzle).

Getting to where the CAF wants to be, it will require technology adoption and changes of processes. It will demand an overhaul of how information is shared and managed across the enterprise and the field. It will require changing how performance is evaluated and rewarded, creating appropriate training packages and encouraging the development of expertise and continuity… These demand time, staff, and efforts… all of which need money.

If we want to reach the future armed forces we want, we need to think of 2 per cent of GDP on defence beyond equipment acquisition and expenditure.

Voila voila (I promise I won’t say that this at the end of my presentation).

1. Don’t ask me about other countries (even France); I don’t know.

2. https://www.cgai.ca/culture_change_beyond_misconduct_addressing_systemic_barriers