NATO Summit 2025
High speed rail, bicycles, windmills, and new defence spending pledge
As I am sitting on the Eurostar back to Paris (the perks of being French), I’m wondering: “has this stackie completely lost its purpose?” I have strayed quite away from the initial premise of “DND/CAF 101,” as I have not been offering much insights into the structural idiosyncrasies of DND/ CAF. Digging myself further in this pit of confusion, now I am presenting to you a stackie about the NATO Summit (if the title had not spoiled you the surprise).
Remaining consistent, staying in my own lane, and being quiet: truly a CDL special.
This elaborate introduction is a roundabout way to discuss my experience at my first NATO Public Forum, to which CGAI was an official partner. This meant that I got to go to The Hague, insult the Dutch by drinking Belgian beer, and make too many sassy comments to whomever was willing to hear them.
Do not get me wrong: I might be writing with a light-hearted tone, but I was truly honoured to be at the NATO Public Forum – my thanks to The Atlantische Commissie, the Cligendaele Institute, and The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (especially Dr. Davis Ellison), for choosing CGAI as a partner and giving me the chance to attend.
The NATO Public Forum
The NATO Public Forum is a massive conference bringing together academics and think tank representatives from across the Alliance. It takes place in the vicinity of the NATO Summit and examines themes relevant to that year’s summit. Without much surprise, building a defence industrial base, increasing defence expenditure, and the U.S.’s commitment to the Alliance were central topics. The makeup of the panels are quite similar to those of CGAI: Oxford-style panels (no introductory remarks, just Q&A between speakers and a moderator).
Speakers included NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Ukraine Defence Minister Rustem Umerov, Lithuanian and Estonian Ministers of Foreign Affairs Kęstutis Budrys and Margus Tsahkna, Chair of the NATO Military Committee, Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, and U.S. Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker. The conference also included quite a novel and interesting format: breakout sessions formatted as TV show (à la “Tout le Monde En Parle”), which featured Ikenna Azuike as brilliant moderator and experts such as Kathleen McInnis, and representing CGAI and Canada, David Perry.
You can access the program here: https://www.natopublicforum.org (you can even watch the livestream!).
All the sessions were insightful, and I always appreciate hearing a variety of perspectives on a central topic (more on it in the next section). The Forum was also a wonderful opportunity to reconnect with fellow Canadian defence think tankers and academics, and meet folks from across the Alliance (including friendly Americans). I am usually not much a networker, but I had the pleasure to meet a such a diversity of people, and I am looking forward to keeping in touch with them.
Now, the takeaways.
The Summit is a prime opportunity for NATO to communicate it is here to stay, and it intends on staying strong. Repeated throughout the discussions, from SecGen Rutte to US Ambo Whitaker to Lithuania and Estonian Foreign Ministers was “peace through strength.” If you did not think that the era of great power competition and deterrence was back, it is very much here. NATO seemed to have overcome its 2010s existential crisis marked by questionable support from its own members. Now, it has got its old mojo back (proof that you do not need to buy a motorcycle to get through your middle life crisis).
Transatlantic unity is back, baby!
Right?
Right?
While there is resolve, especially amongst Eastern countries, it is safe to say that there is a reluctance to take this renewed sense of solidarity for granted. And rightfully so. Regardless of where you look at it, the new tenant of the White House has been the catalyst of this impetus. Not to disregard the effect of Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but Trump’s reelection really appeared to have had a taser effect on members of the Alliance.1 Had there been awareness that the state of affairs needed changing? Yes. But we let risk averse and slow decision making take the upper hand.
The panels and the Secretary General’s press conference after the communiqué was released confirms this perception – that Trump was the instigator of this firmer language (long gone are the days of NATO being “brain dead”!) and new defence investment pledge (of 5% per cent of GDP in defence spending, more on that later).
The other caveat is that this resolve is not necessarily enthusiastic or celebratory in nature. The conversations were tough and sobering. With an America taking a tough love (not to say abusive) approach to transatlantic collective defence, we are facing a profound structural change in the European architecture. The European Union is now getting involved in defence matters, and Canada is joining in on the efforts.
The sessions reminded us of how behind we were in terms of military modernization and the development of mass. A lot of work needs to be done, and has to involve everyone: militaries, various government agencies working on innovation, transport, economic development, as well as the citizenry.
There will be a section on what I think the discussions were missing, but I want to make a note about societal resilience here. The concept “whole of nation” was mentioned, but I could not remember any conversation on what it truly meant beyond motivating citizens to be ready for war if it came to it. While I would say that the transatlantic spirit is no longer taken for granted, the larger citizenry of each NATO member is. In the panel on societal resilience, the conversations revolved around getting citizens to serve in the military in one way or another (full time or part time service, short or long term). Little was said about why citizens are becoming disconnected from their institutions to the point that we are unsure they will fight to protect their way of life. More on that later.
To sum up: NATO’s middle life crisis is over. Now, let’s get to work.
From Expert Panels to the Declaration
My second day of the Forum centred on one thing: the Declaration. It came out around 2:30 pm CET, and contains only 6 paragraphs.
What jumps out immediately is the recall to Article 5 and Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty – for over a decade now, the commitment to those treaty obligations remained in question. Trump explicitly said that American support for article 5 might be contingent on the concerned countries’ defence spending. This is putting a large asterisk to Article 5, creating a potential interpretation that Article 5 is contingent on how members respect their obligations under Article 3.
As a result, the real meat of the Declaration revolves around a new investment pledge: “5% of GDP annually on core defence requirements as well as defence- and security-related spending by 2035.” This new spending commitment is broken down into 3.5% on core defence spending, and 1.5% of GDP worth of investments in matters that support the defence and security of the country. This includes “critical infrastructure,” the development of the defence industrial base, and the advancement of innovation. The target to reach that level of spending is 2035, with a review scheduled for 2029.
An important piece to that commitment includes support for Ukraine’s defence and its defence industry. At a time when the North Atlantic’s commitment to helping Ukraine win the war appeared to wane, this pledge is significant and most welcome.
In between the lines of the communiqué, and a feature I would not have been aware of if it was not for the Public Forum, is the fact that the Alliance is coordinating in terms of defence capabilities. There is a review of the Alliance’s capabilities, and there seems to be an effort in place to avoid duplication while creating contingencies. There are efforts to ensure this investment is done in a way that brings value to the defence of the Alliance and its individual members.
Back to the Trump Effect
The perception is that this new pledge is a capitulation of NATO to Trump’s aggressive bargaining (after all, since he came back in office, he has been quite loud in his expectations that NATO members spend as much on defence as the U.S.
As I wrote earlier, we cannot deny the influence of Trump in The Hague investment pledge. That being said, I think it is strategically short-sighted to believe that this just benefits the U.S. In fact, I think that the new defence spending target is a tactical “victory” for Trump, it is a strategic one for all the other NATO members.
Increased defence spending to the same percentage of GDP as the U.S. means that NATO’s reliance on the U.S. will decline. As a result, should we continue to see an American president go back and forth on their support for the Alliance and article 5 of the Washington/ North Atlantic Treaty, Europe and Canada are now more resilient and are no longer at the mercy of policy mood swings. This will help the North Atlantic moving forward, especially at the domestic future of the U.S. is not guaranteed. We cannot assume that the post-Trump era will look like the Obama era of U.S. domestic and foreign policy. The rest of the Alliance needs to prepare itself to this uncertain future in order to ensure its stability.
This will serve to protect our right to self-determine the direction of our approach to defence and foreign policy, and even make us more resilient. Of course, it imposes certain obligations for allies, as treaty signatories. But paradoxically, it is a question of sovereignty and independence.
If I were to advise the non-U.S. NATO heads of state, I honestly think that this is how I would translate The Hague Declaration. I think this unspoken piece (for now) is the most crucial point to make when communicating about the new defence pledge. Communication is key, and emphasizing these benefits so that our populations accept the costs will be critical.
As one can read in the Declaration, this new defence pledge defined the Summit. But I think the silences also speak volume.
What has been missing
Societal Resilience and Restoring Faith in Democratic System
The first paragraph of The Hague Declaration speaks to the Alliance commitment to “safeguard[ing] our freedom and democracy.” I think that understanding this commitment in terms of defence is warranted. But protecting freedoms and democracy also comes with other obligations from NATO governments.
We are so stuck in thinking the resurgence of extremism is simply due to stupidity and [insert prejudicial belief system] (which, do not get me wrong, IS a factor), that we forget to address what led people to feel so alienated from the institutions that are supposed to serve them that they endorse policies that contribute to the demise of democracy. Rarely do we see “mainstream” politicians ask about what caused this sentiment and how to restore social trust. Civics education will help, but ensuring that institutions do deliver on their promises (and examining the outcomes, not their intent) is essential. Or, if promises cannot be implemented, explain clearly as to why governments cannot pursue them.
This has direct security implications. There is a strong correlation between distrust in institutions and falling for misinformation, and Russia’s disinformation strategy has been one of exploiting grievances already present in society. Restoring trust amongst the citizenry is critical to preserve democracy.
The “Soft Security” Matters
Now that NATO has retrieved its raison d’être, it seems that its support for Women, Peace, and Security and climate security has gone silent. I am concerned with this faux post-materialist approach to defence, where matters that relate to defence but do not fit the traditional mold of defence and security disappear from public discourse.
There is also an infantilization of these topics, now that we are back to being “serious” about defence, we need to let go of these “naive” (if not “childish”) concerns.
The issue remains that women are not properly integrated in defence, security, and peace processes. Kits still do not fit women properly and women continue to be excluded from peace processes. This has effects on the duration of peace and on operational readiness, effectiveness, and the rates of casualties. If a woman’s equipment cannot protect her effectively or is likely to induce injuries, this will cost us in a war of attrition where mass (both in terms of people and capabilities) is critical. The proper inclusion of women can also help in gaining a better situational awareness on the ground (see reports that women intelligence officers rang the alarms about the 7 October 2023 attack, but were not believed). Further, gender equality has been proven as a powerful indicator of peace. If we are to invest heavily in defence to “safeguard our freedom and democracy,” then making sure that everyone is considered is critical.
Climate security has fallen victim to the same silence. The reality remains that climate change continues to be underway. As I am sitting here in Malakoff, France is bracing itself for its third heatwave of June. Over 30 degrees in l’Île-de-France used to be a rare occasion; I remember the 2004 heat wave and the panic it caused. Now it is a regular occurrence. Climate change induces extreme weather events and natural disasters and depletes critical resources (including water and food), which has profound effects on defence, peace, and security. If we want to avoid conflicts and improve global societal resilience, addressing climate security is essential.
Being serious about defence means that we need to be serious about those matters, too. If the principle is “peace through strength,” then we need to be strong on those matters as well.
I understand that priorities change, but I believe it is in our strategic interest not to let these fall on the wayside.
The Most Historic Summit (So Far)
It seems that every Summit is historic – this one is no exception. But there is an extra dose of historic in this one: European allies and Canada agreed to significantly increase their defence spending to 5% of GDP, putting themselves on an equal footing to the U.S. The strategic implications, globally and domestically, are massive.
Earlier this today, a radio host asked me what would it mean for the Canadian economy and Canadians. While I am not too sure (I am no economist), I do think that there is an opportunity here for the government to think about whether or not the way we have invested in health care, education, etc… has been most efficient. Mind you, I am not advocating for cuts here, necessarily. What I am saying is that we should examine how we can get more bang for our buck. Take health care, for example: Canada is in the top ten of OECD countries in terms of spending in healthcare (at about 11.22% of GDP in 2023), but the reported satisfaction with the system was 56% (in 2022), 10 percentage points lower than the OECD average. I think there is a challenge there that we need to address – and it is about spending better.
Will there be trade offs? Of course there will be. Unfortunately, expenditure is a zero-sum game. But I do not think that the translation will immediately be that our social safety net will be dismantled or made worse. We have the opportunity to do better – not just in terms of defence, but in terms of creating a society that protects its citizens and democracy holistically.
It is only in 2026 that Canada aims to reach 2 per cent of GDP in defence spending, and it was only since the invasion of Ukraine that we’ve seen European allies really ramping up their defence spending. The first commitment to reaching 2 per cent in GDP in defence spending was during the Wales Summit of 2014.