Lying To Ourselves?
Let's stop treating our challenges in silos
What does Pierre Poilièvre, culture change, “wokeism,” and the CF-18 Fighter Force have in common?
More than meets the eye.
In my usual Charlottesplaining tendencies, here’s the context behind writing this piece:
Reading comments from Pierre Poilièvre, supplemented by The Hon. Peter MacKay’s and Dr. David Perry’s analyses regarding 2 per cent of GDP in defence spending, woke culture in the military, and the warrior culture – read Catherine Cullen’s article on the matter: https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/poilievre-armed-forces-military-nato-1.7258338
Reading Professor Justin Bronk’s report on the CF-18 Fighter Force for the Department of National Defence’s Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security (MINDS) program
My private conversation with a retired general officer
My current research on the personnel implications of the integration of fifth-generation technologies in the Royal Canadian Air Force
That is just from the past week. But there is also five years of overthinking of the matter.
And if you want to skip the story because it is Monday morning and you have better things to do, let me provide you with the bottom lines upfront (ou BLUF, pour les intimes).1
The culture change the Canadian Armed Forces needs to pursue is one that:
improves readiness
improves operational effectiveness
improves retention
does so while upholding the Canadian Armed Forces espoused ethical values of "respecting the dignity of all persons"
This culture change can only happen if we understand the core problems within the military personnel management system.
Why the title?
I wanted to pay homage to the article from two U.S. military researchers, Leonard Wong and Stephen Gerras, “Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession.”2 This is one of my favourite article of all times, one that explicitly outlines how poor personnel management can lead to unethical conduct in the U.S. Army. It is a short, yet riveting read that would sound familiar to many in the CAF.
I also want to expand a bit on this title to trigger a reflection on how we have treated personnel policy in Canada, how it ties to matters of misconduct, procurement, or even operational readiness and effectiveness. As we continue to figure out the way forward, we need to ask ourselves real questions on how we do defence policy.
Hold on there, little Frenchie, are you proselytizing right now?
Here I come to you with the biggest BS answer: “It may come across that way, but it is not my intention.“ This is rather me thinking out loud – about the work I have been doing so far, and how I want to move things forward for myself. I am in this “we.”
What I am trying to do here is to tie my very specific research to my larger interests and reflection as I (hopefully) continue to participate in stakeholder engagements and consultations held by the Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces.
In short, I am trying.
I know it is giving “main character energy,” but this is my stackie. I’ll indulge a little bit.3
Challenges for the Fighter Force…
I would like to start with talking about the Fighter Force and why we should get out of our pilot-exceptionalism approach to personnel policy.
One thing that I have found fascinating over the past five years living and working in the Ottawa-bubble side of defence is the fact that the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) pilots tend to be the focus of our personnel concerns in the military. It is the occupation we focus upon when thinking beyond recruitment to include concerns over occupational training, equipment availability, and occupation-specific retention.
My hunch is that it might be one of the officer occupations that is the most easily transferrable to civvy street and that enjoys the most prestige.
While pilots are indeed critical to the RCAF’s readiness, the challenges with their personnel management are (1) grossly impacted by larger systemic problems other occupations face; (2) far from being unique across the military.
In his 2023 study of the CF-18 Fighter Force (with a focus on the Wings at CFB Cold Lake and CFB Gagetown), Prof. Justin Bronk from the Royal United Service Institute found the following systemic challenges for fighter force readiness4:
lack of instructors (in terms of numbers and quality)
leads to a lack of training hours
lack of aircraft availability
high attrition of technicians
inadequate management of spare parts
includes a lack of accountability for those tasked to properly manage the supply and proper delivery
leads to unpredictable flying schedules
high turnover of certain support staff – intense periods of training have to repeat themselves frequently
outdated personal equipment that could lead to injury
burdensome bureaucratic and administrative processes
collapse of trust in the chain of command
senior leaders not believing problems communicated from subordinates, believing their (past and outdated) personal experiences first.
Those broad issues are contributing to a decline in morale and high rates of attrition, especially amongst technicians.
This is not the first time we have a study of the Fighter Force painting a pretty grim picture of its state of readiness. Here’s what the Office of the Auditor General found in 2018:5
While the government of Canada, in 2016, increased the operational requirements for fighter aircraft (i.e., be ready to meet highest NORAD alert level alongside NATO requirements), it did not prioritize setting the RCAF for success in terms of readiness. The CF-18 at this time were over 20 years old and the RCAF was experiencing pilot and technician shortages.
On the personnel front6, the OAG found that:
before 2016, the RCAF did not have enough pilots and technicians to effectively operate the fleet.
In 2018, 22% of the technician workforce was vacant or filled by technicians not fully trained to do maintenance.
Technicians were able to prepare an average of 83% of the aircraft needed for the new requirement
In 2017, National Defence had approved a plan to increase the number of aircraft available – a plan that was in the early stages of implementation in 2018.
Attrition of technicians was so severe that between 2014 and 2018, the hours of maintenance needed for every hour of flying the CF-18 increased from 21 to 24.
Because of the maintenance issues, close to 30% pilots were unable to fly the minimum 140 hours required to sustain the capability.
Attrition of pilots was also a challenge – over two years (2016-18), the RCAF was only able to replace 30 of the 40 pilots who had left.
Despite having an annual plan to improve recruitment in several occupations, there was no plan to specifically address the shortage of CF-18 pilots and support the RCAF meeting the operational requirements laid out in 2016.
I would like to highlight a point the OAG made at the beginning of its report:
“the Government of Canada identified a fighter aircraft fleet as a critical capability of the Canadian Armed Forces. To meet this capability, the Royal Canadian Air Force needs enough pilots to fly the aircraft and enough technicians to do maintenance and repairs. It also needs enough fighter aircraft to control Canada’s vast airspace and to contribute to international operations at the same time.” (emphasis from yours truly)
It seems obvious, but I think sometimes we do not concern ourselves enough with the personnel piece of our capability and readiness.
You might tell me “Charlotte, you gave us a vague paraphrasing of a not-for-release report and of a 6-year-old report, you’re not proving anything.” To which I would respond, “hold on, young Padawan, I am just getting started.” Because now we have a 2023 report Assistant Deputy Minister (Review Services) entering the conversation.7 Here’s what they found:
As of 2021/22, personnel shortages were still compromising the RCAF’s Force Posture & Readiness
Improper integration of GBA Plus “into strategic development of training … could be considered a hindrance to [the RCAF’s] readiness posture.”
Despite a centralized training authority for the 28 occupations the RCAF manages, training remains uncoordinated and not harmonized (CDL note: despite the RCAF managing 28 occupations, the Military Personnel Command still have significant authority in terms of training and policy).
data on personnel is not centralized, causing oversight issues.
Communication across chains of command remains to be desired
Under-resourced administrative processes
Lack of instructors
Aging aircraft
Now, we are seeing patterns. Issues with the Fighter Force has been at least eight years in the making. But believing that these are completely unique to the RCAF is overlooking the connective tissue that makes the Canadian Armed Forces an organization. This is not to say that the RCAF does not face challenges that differ from the rest of the CAF (of course it does because it is a different environment). Rather, it is to underline that some of those issues also impact the rest of the CAF.
… Are Pervasive (Personnel) Problems
Very conveniently, ADM(Review Services) conducted a study similar to its "“Evaluation of Ready Air and Space Forces”: “Evaluation of Ready Land Forces”8 and “Evaluation of Ready Joint and Combined Forces.”9 There is an “Evaluation of Naval Forces,” but it dates back to 2019, and we do not have an updated study – yet. Still, worth examining.10
So, what are the challenges with the Ready Land Forces program?
Lack of reliable data on the readiness of equipment
Lack of necessary equipment to meet training and readiness objectives
that includes the availability of personal equipment
Limited “ability to transport and sustain equipment efficiently”
Unresponsiveness of the procurement process
Not enough technicians (particularly Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers Technicians)
Under-utilized simulation training
As of fiscal year 2021/22, the Ready Land Forces program did not appear to be in the same dire situation of readiness as the Ready Air and Space Forces program. However, without intervention, ADM (Review Services) argues, the Canadian Army might not be able to meet its readiness objectives.
The challenges to the Ready Joint and Combined Forces are as follows:
Shortages of personnel and “a perceived lack of training”
Inadequate technologies and classified system capabilities
Human resource system is “strained,” jeopardizing the CAF’s ability to meet its NATO commitments
Lack of “coordinating function that is holistically looking at all elements of joint force readiness.”
As for the Ready Naval Forces, here’s what was going on between fiscal year 2013/14 to 2017/18:
It seems that the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) was doing quite well in terms of meeting its readiness requirements (submarines notwithstanding)
the evaluation seems to credit the RCN’s increased expenditures for the Ready Naval Forces program.
“The RCN is challenged to crew units with the requisite personnel and training in accordance with readiness requirements.”
While significant organizational changes had taken place within the RCN, authorities, responsibilities, and accountabilities had yet to be clarified.
Mismatch between training requirements and training schedules
As to be expected, we see variations across services and programs. That being said we see recurring themes:
personnel shortages
less than ideal data management
equipment availability
training challenges (due to lack of adequately qualified instructors, issues of too many requirements without the time to execute said training).
Based on one of my previous analyses, those are quite common concerns across the board for DND/CAF.11
I know that what I am presenting to you is quite shallow, but one of my observations here is that we are severely lacking real, CAF-wide personnel studies that are available to the public. The Directorate General Military Personnel Research and Analysis rarely publishes its research, and the Defence Research and Development Canada database is opaque at best. ADM (Review Services) does provide interesting evaluations that give us some insights into personnel challenges, there are quite infrequent. The last Office of the Auditor General’s report on matters directly connected to personnel was on sexual misconduct in 2018, and the last study on recruitment and retention dates back to 2016. All of these entities are client-based, so they do not have the authority to decide what gets studied or not; and for internal-DND entities, they do not have the authority to publish their research at will.
Poor Management, Poor Ethics?
Now, let’s tie it to ethical (mis)conduct. The link is not necessarily obvious, but it is worth highlighting.
In their article “Lying to Ourselves,” Wong and Gerras uncover how personnel problems can breed unethical conduct. Far from calling individual service members unethical, they rather underline that “the military needs to introspectively examine how it might be inadvertently abetting the very behavior it deems unacceptable.” (p. 3).
Contributing factors to what they call “dishonesty” in the chain of commands are: “a deluge of requirements,” paired with a zero-defect mindset (CDL addition: that blames the individual leaders, rather than the system, for deficiencies).
Here are some examples in the article that are impactful:
“In the rush by higher headquarters to incorporate every good idea into training, the total number of training days required by all mandatory training directives literally exceeds the number of training days available to company commanders. Company commanders somehow have to fit 297 days of mandatory requirements into 256 available training days.”
“I had a platoon sergeant when I first became a platoon leader, and I walked into the office and he was printing out certificates with people’s names on them. I was like, “What are you doing?” He says, “Mandatory training!” It was so accepted. It’s almost like corruption.”
And my personal “favourite”: “We needed to get SHARP [Sexual Harassment and Assault Response and Prevention] training done and reported to higher headquarters, so we called the platoons and told them to gather the boys around the radio and we said, ‘Don’t touch girls.’ That was our quarterly SHARP training.”
By doing this study and displaying those examples, Wong and Gerras underline that there is a process of blurring the ethical lines that occur. If it is acceptable to lessen ethical standards within one context, in what context is it unacceptable to do so? If the bar keeps on moving, how can we identify it?
Before I move to the Canadian side of this conversation, let me bring to you a gruesome example from the Brereton study (an Inspector General investigation into allegations of war crimes perpetrated by Australian troops in Afghanistan).12 At some point during the war, the number of enemy killed in action became (or was perceived as) a key performance indicator. Meaning that the more enemies killed, the better a unit would be doing. As a result, there were instances in which troops killed civilians simply based on their proximity to an alleged Taliban/ insurgent compound. In some others, weapons implanted next to or on the victim so as to give justification to the killing. Those troops lied in their reporting; what Brereton does not examine, but that Wong and Gerras suggest might have happened: was being dishonest/ not fully accurate in reports a practice in their home units?
Now I talked about the U.S. Army and the Australian Special Forces – what does it have to do with Canada? Well, we have proof that similar issues are happening here, as well.
Defining corruption as “dishonest action that destroys people’s trust,” Allan English conducted a study similar to Wong and Gerras, but in the Canadian military.13 Here are the “systemic factors” he argued are contributing to the problem here:
resource-mission mismatch (“when governments and higher headquarters demand more from units than can possibly be achieved given the resources allocated to them.”);
bureaucratic culture (i.e., a culture focused on “administrative efficiency,” that is rules-based instead of values-based);
an “up or sidelined” approach to promotion that incentivizes careerism.
transactional leadership.
English uses the conclusions of the Deschamps report14 and the Board of Inquiry on Canadian soldiers’ response to sexual assault of young boys by Afghan troops15 to underline those issues. Now, in 2024, we can add Mme Arbour’s report to the list of reports that underline how the structure of the military impacts its culture, and therefore the behaviour of its members.
Further, and to cite myself quickly, I saw a correlation between organizational stress, widespread misconduct, and toxic leadership in the Canadian military during the 1990s. My book was a first attempt at underlying those, and I am hoping to dig more into the role the structure can play in shaping (bad) actions.
CDL CAVEAT™️: I am not saying that service members are unethical; in fact, I can only count a couple of bad interactions I’ve had with a current and former service members (and there’s only one of them that I would blame on the other person’s character). I have become close with a good number of service members over the past couple of years, and they’ve enriched my life significantly.
I do think that the reality is more complex than that. I do not believe that you either have the right character or not – I believe it is more nuance than that. Without going to philosophical on this, but let’s just say that I believe in the Rousseau-ian principle that all humans are good at heart, but that they can be their morals can be corrupted by circumstances, including organizations.
What Woke’s Got to Do With It?
Well, for the past couple of years now we got ourselves stuck in a culture war narrative. The leader of the Conservative Party of Canada has said that the culture of the Canadian Armed Forces has become ‘woke,’ we see more and more commentary (including from former Minister of National Defence Peter MacKay) that the military is “over-correcting,” or is betraying its warrior identity.
The latest culprit? The changes in dress regulations.
I have some thoughts about it, and if you follow me on Twitter, you’ve seen them. No need for repetition, and no need for me to further participate in a narrative that I think is unproductive.
What worries me, however, is that we are trying to find something to blame (equity, diversity, and inclusion initiatives) and culture change for the CAF’s current readiness situation.
What I want to focus on, rather, is one sentence in Catherine Cullen’s coverage on the matter:
Perry agreed there needs to be a "rebalancing" within the military to put more emphasis on core functions.
Before I start on this, another CDL Caveat™️: I know that communicating with the media is a complex feat – it is in fact David Perry that taught me as much. Without putting the blame on Catherine Cullen or on David Perry, it is important to underline that this sentence is extracted from a usually 15-30 min conversation. Only Ms. Cullen and Dr. Perry know the context in which this point was made.
Regardless of that context and that caveat, however, there are some things to be said:
Do we know if budgets related to procurement, readiness, exercises, deployments, i.e., the military’s “core functions” have been sacrificed for the sake of culture change?
Have personnel put in procurement–, readiness–, exercises–, deployment–related activities been re-shuffled to staff Chief Professional Conduct and Culture?
In the budget cuts announced last year, did procurement–, readiness–, exercises–, deployment–related activities experience cuts greater than culture change did?
Have service members been asked to put some of their tasks on hold to implement culture change?
Not to leave you with just questions, here’s what I found from the Departmental Plans 2023/2416 and 2024/2517:
We could argue that culture change is listed as a “core responsibility,” under the title “Defence Team,” i.e., “Recruit, develop and support an agile and diverse Defence team, within a healthy workplace free from harmful behaviour; support military families; and meet the needs of all retiring military personnel, including the ill and injured. Strengthen Canadian communities by investing in youth.”
one of the indicators is “The Defence Team reflects the values and diversity of Canadian society,” and includes representation goals, caps on the percentage of Defence Team members that experience harassment, discrimination, and misconduct.
this is one indicator among 5 in this category, which are:
meeting the 101,500 authorized strength under Strong, Secure, Engaged;
ensuring members of the Defence Team are healthy and supported (which includes metrics such as medical fitness to serve, “reasonable quality of life,” attitudes towards work)
resilience of military family
Canadian youth participation in the Cadet program
In the 2023/24 Department Plan, “culture” and “cultural change/evolution” appear about 60 times (38 in the 2024/25 Department Plan). In comparison, “procurement” is mentioned 87 times (64 times in the 2024/25 Department Plan), any form of the term “operation” are featured about 694 times (302 in the 2024/25 Department Plan), and “equipment” is mentioned 54 times (44 in the 2024/25 Department Plan).
So we do see quite an emphasis on culture, but given that about 34.4% of respondents in 2021/22 said that they felt the Canadian Armed Forces “provide[d] a reasonable quality of life for service members and their family,” we might think it is warranted.
In terms of spending, the 2024/25 Department Plan projects DND/CAF to spend a bit over $4.2 billion on the “Defence Team” core responsibility. Here is the projected spending for the other categories
Operations: $2.2 billion (shy of $2.3)
Ready Forces: $11.3 billion
Future Force Design: shy of $866 million
Procurement of Capability $6.2 billions
Sustainable Bases, Information Technology System and Infrastructure: $4.49 billion
Beyond those factual questions, however, we need to ask ourselves: isn’t culture an important part of profession’s privilege to regulate itself?
If you look at the literature and at doctrines, it is. And it is particularly important in the context of professions in which the use of force is part of the mandate.
We trust the Canadian military to conduct operations with success, and that comes with what I would call “enterprise-related activities” that enable that success: good personnel management (from recruitment to training to postings, well-fitting and adequate equipment), effective procurement system, excellent maintenance of equipment, a data management apparatus ensuring connection between key enablers.
Effective systems, including a healthy culture is part of it.
Further, in the words of US Army War College Dr. Don Snider: trust is “the ‘currency of professions’,” particularly when the consent to be sent into harm’s way is involved.18 Without a healthy culture in which all service members are treated like they are valuable members of the team, how can trust thrive?
I know the controversy around culture change right now is around the changing dress regulations. I think we are making a mountain out of a molehill – the military is trying to figure out how to deal with changing values and accommodating different grooming preferences. Could they have done it better? Maybe. But I would rather see an institution that takes risks, monitors the effects, and adapts according to those effects than a military that takes years to draft the perfect policy, fires it out, and then forgets.
In terms of long hair for men and pink hair being allowed: (1) unnatural hair colour is not allowed in the field, especially when camouflage is involved; (2) we all fantasize about Vikings’ warrior-like nature. They have long hair.
Much ado about not much.
Lying to Myself?
I need to conclude there, because I am close to reaching 4,000 words and I have to get breakfast still.
I come across as a defender of culture change – and I am. One person who gets assaulted/ harassed/ discriminated against in the military is one too many, and we should treat it as such. Especially when that comes with a lack of support in the chain of command.
Does it mean that the military will find a way to eradicate all forms of misconduct? Let’s not be silly – history has shown us that humans have a capacity to be extremely heinous towards one another. But is it a reason not to try? Absolutely not.
That being said, do I question myself every day about the way that I advocate culture change and the way I think about it? Yes. 100% times yes. I sit with a lot of doubt, and I try to foster this space of discomfort within myself.
At the end of her third status report, Mme Therrien argues that:
the process involved in establishing or modifying policy and guidance documents is an elaborate, multi-layered process that involves many checkpoints. I have observed that many people are called upon to comment throughout the development phase, sometimes leading to many versions that keep circulating. While I would agree that some discussion with specialists and other stakeholders may be required, in my view, at some point, these consultations become counterproductive, and they create significant delays.
I participate in a lot of Chief Professional Conduct and Culture consultations (I basically try to make it to each and every one I am invited to), and I see myself in those comments – do I participate in the risk averse approach to policy change? My first instinct would be to say “no, absolutely not.”
I am, in fact, like other girls [commentators on public policy].
But let’s get back to the initial point of this stackie and the hill I will die on:
Culture change will fail if we do not implement it in parallel to meaningful personnel management and structural reforms.
This is where I think we’re lying to ourselves when making culture change the battleground of culture wars. Service members across the board, especially non-commissioned members, feel like they are not being heard, that they are “meat in a meat grinder” (to quote a veteran whose interview I analyzed as part of my work at the Centre for International and Defence Policy).
Challenges each service members will experience differ based on who they are – and the data proves it.
If we want trust to come back, if we want readiness to prevail, then culture change needs to happen.
Because of course there is not just one, voyons!
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/466/
For the non-zillenials/ Gen Z: “I know it is very self-centred and self-aggrandizing of me, but given that this is my blog, I’ll indulge.”
The report is not for release, so I will keep it at a high level – there are additional reports that substantiate his findings.
The report focuses on 3 themes: “New operational requirement,” “Personnel,” and “Interim aircraft” – we’ll focus only on personnel.
Here’s the link to the PDF, although now reports from board of inquiries need to be requested: http://www.forces.gc.ca/assets/FORCES_Internet/docs/en/about-reports-pubs-%20boards-inquiry/about-reports-pubs-boards-inquiry.pdf
Excellent analysis of state of personnel mgt. Degradation in name of managerialism and overhead reduction has plagued HR across public services generally since about 1980. CAF is not exempt. Informative to track the well documented parallel history of PSC to understand CAF dynamics. Thanks.